2.9 State Court Jurisdiction over Federal Claims
Updated 2013 by Jeffrey S. Gutman
In determining whether state courts are allowed to entertain jurisdiction over federally created causes of action, the Supreme Court has applied a presumption of concurrency.1 Under this presumption, state courts may exercise jurisdiction over federally created causes of action as long as Congress has not explicitly or implicitly made federal court jurisdiction exclusive.2 An implied exclusivity can result from an “unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interest.”3 In considering whether a federal claim is incompatible with state court jurisdiction, the Court looks to “the desirability of uniform interpretation, the expertise of federal judges in federal law, and the assumed greater hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly federal claims.”4 Under this framework, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty, bankruptcy, patent, trademark, and copyright claims because the relevant jurisdictional statutes expressly provide so.5 In other areas, such as antitrust, the federal statutes do not make federal court jurisdiction exclusive, but courts found an implied exclusivity.6
State courts may exercise jurisdiction over claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7 Although the Court has not expressly addressed state court jurisdiction over the other Reconstruction-era civil rights actions, it reviewed a 42 U.S.C. § 1982 action arising in the state courts without any apparent doubt about the permissibility of state courts to entertain such actions.8 Moreover, state courts addressing issues involving 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1982, both having their origins in Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its 1870 reenactment, concluded that they were allowed to entertain such actions.9
A state court may decline to entertain a federal claim if it adheres to a neutral rule of judicial administration. That rule must not violate the Supremacy Clause by treating the federal claim less favorably than a parallel state claim. In Howlett v. Rose the Court was asked to decide whether common-law sovereign immunity was available to a state school board to preclude a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even though such a defense would be unavailable in federal court.10 The state court had dismissed the lawsuit on grounds that the school board, as an arm of the state, had not waived its sovereign immunity in Section 1983 cases. The Howlett Court stated that state common-law immunity was eliminated by acts of Congress in which Congress expressly made the states liable.11 The Court held that the state court’s refusal to entertain a Section 1983 claim against the school district, when state courts entertained similar state-law actions against state defendants, violated the Supremacy Clause.12
More recently, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute that divested its state courts from entertaining Section 1983 or state law claims for damages by prisoners against state correctional employees.13 The state legislature determined that these kinds of lawsuits were frequently frivolous and channeled them into the state court of claims, which offered more limited remedies and more stringent procedural requirements. The Supreme Court held that the state law violated the Supremacy Clause because it reflected a policy contrary to Congress’ view that state actors are liable for money damages when they violate federal constitutional rights under color of state law.14 The Court further determined that merely because the state treated Section 1983 and parallel state law claims equally did not mean that the law was a neutral rule of judicial administration and therefore a valid excuse for barring the federal claim from being heard in state court: “[a]lthough the absence of discrimination is necessary to our finding a state law neutral, it is not sufficient. A jurisdictional rule cannot be used as a device to undermine federal law, no matter how evenhanded it may appear.”15
- Chapter 1: Preparing for Litigation
- Chapter 2: Jurisdiction
- 2.1 Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
- 2.2 Pleading Requirements
- 2.3 Federal Question Jurisdiction
- 2.4 Other Jurisdictional Statutes
- 2.5 Litigation Against the Government
- 2.6 Supplemental Jurisdiction
- 2.7 Removal Jurisdiction
- 2.8 Abstention—Discretion to Decline Jurisdiction
- 2.9 State Court Jurisdiction over Federal Claims
- Chapter 3: The Case or Controversy Requirement and Other Preliminary Hurdles
- Chapter 4: Drafting and Filing the Complaint
- Chapter 5: Causes of Action
- Chapter 6: Pretrial and Trial Practice
- Chapter 7: Class Actions
- Chapter 8: Limitations on Relief
- Chapter 9: Relief
Updated 2013 by Jeffrey S. Gutman
- See, e.g., Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S.130, 136 (1876); see generally Martin H. Redish & John Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 311 (1976).
- Yellow Freight System, Incorporated v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 822 (1990). Congress may, of course, expressly permit state courts to entertain certain federal claims. State courts are authorized to hear claims arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1), and Title VIII actions involving housing discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a). State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims. Yellow Freight System, Incorporated, 494 U.S. at 820.
- Gulf Offshore Company v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 453 U.S. 473, 477–78 (1981). Closely related to this concept is a federal statute’s complete preemption of state law causes of action, thereby effectively vesting the federal court with exclusive jurisdiction over the claim. See, e.g., Aetna Health Incorporated v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (discussing “pre-emptive force” of ERISA and Labor Management Relations Act).
- Gulf Offshore Company, 453 U.S. at 483–84. See also Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 271 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing considerations of uniformity, federal expertise, and federal hospitality to federal claims).
- See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333–1334, 1338. Congress may also vest exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal claims in the statute creating the claim. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (federal securities law).
- See, e.g., General Investment Company v. Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, 260 U.S. 261, 286-88 (1922).
- See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 731 (2009); Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 506-07 (1982); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980).
- Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
- See, e.g., Miles v. FERM Enterprises, Incorporated, 627 P.2d 564 (1981); see also DeHorney v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, 879 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1989) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Section 1981 suits); Blount v. Stroud, 904 N.E.2d. 1, 232 Ill. 2d 302, 328 (2009) (holding that state circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear 1981 claims); People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Cook Development Company,274 Ill. App. 3d 175, 185 (Ill App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995) (concluding Section 1982 actions may be brought against state); Barber v. Rancho Mortgage & Investment Corporation,26 Cal. App. 4th 1819, 1833 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1994) (entertaining Section 1982 claim in state court for housing discrimination).Cf. Filipino Accountants Association Incorporated v. State Board of Accountancy, 204 Cal. Rptr. 913, 915 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (assuming state court jurisdiction over Section 1981 actions); State v. Sebastian, 243 Conn. 115, 160 (Conn. 1997) (suggesting state court’s failure to exercise jurisdiction would be violation of Indians’ rights under Section 1981); Collins v. Department of Transportation, 208 Ga. App. 53, 56 n.2 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Section 1981 as example of state court subject matter jurisdiction over federal law actions). State courts also consistently exercised jurisdiction over actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and alleging conspiracies to deprive individuals of equal protection of the laws, a result which is not surprising considering the common origin of Section 1985 and Section 1983 in the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See, e.g., Rajneesh Foundation International v. McGreer, 734 P.2d 871 (Or. 1987) (allowing Section 1985(3) counterclaim). State courts also assumed the availability of state court jurisdiction over Section 1985(2) claims involving the administration of justice in state courts. See Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 711 P.2d 1207 (Ariz. 1985).
- Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
- Id. at 376.
- But see National Private Truck Council, Incorporated v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582, 587 n.4 (1995) (“We have never held that state courts must entertain § 1983 suits”) (citations omitted).
- Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009). See also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (striking down Wisconsin’s notice of claim requirements as applied to Section 1983 claims filed in state court).
- Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736-37.
- Id. at 739.